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 Recent decades have seen an explosion of literature on the relation between 
religion and liberal democracy, much of it inspired (positively or negatively) by Rawls, 
but Derek Malone-France’s new book, Faith, Fallibility, and the Virtue of Anxiety: An 
Essay in Religion and Political Liberalism, moves this debate forward in potentially 
fruitful and completely novel ways by drawing attention to the epistemic and political 
significance of human finitude and fallibility.1 On Malone-France’s account, anxiety -- 
conceived as an epistemic (and also civic) virtue deliberately to be cultivated, rather 
than an existential “problem” to be lamented or suppressed -- constitutes a hitherto 
largely untapped resource for liberal political theorists, as well as for those seeking to 
forge an overlapping consensus among citizens subscribing to divergent comprehensive 
doctrines. 
 Malone-France’s book is both intellectually challenging and beautifully written, 
and it ranks alongside Christopher Eberle’s Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics 
(2002) and Jeffrey Stout’s Democracy and Tradition (2004) as one of the finest, most 
important books of its kind. Like Stout’s book, its scope includes, but extends well 
                                                
1 Derek Malone-France, Faith, Fallibility, and the Virtue of Anxiety: An Essay in Religion and Political 
Liberalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Subsequent parenthetical references are to page 
numbers in this volume. 
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beyond, the question of whether it is ever appropriate to rely on religious reasons in 
political decision-making. More fundamentally, Faith, Fallibility, and the Virtue of Anxiety 
is concerned with both philosophical and theological questions about what, following 
Kant, Malone-France calls transcendental anthropology, i.e., constitutive features of 
human existence as such. Stepping beyond any possible historical bifurcation between 
religious and liberal sensibilities, Malone-France finds in the universally shared condition 
of human finitude “the necessary bridge concept between authentic religious faith and 
Enlightenment liberal norms” (30). 
 I share many of Malone-France’s concerns and find his argument here largely 
persuasive. Like Malone-France, I am a fallibilist (although I suppose I could be 
mistaken about that) with both theological and democratic convictions, which I like to 
think are not incompatible. I am not a process theologian and so will leave Malone-
France’s discussion of process thought (in Chapters 5 and 6) for others to address, but 
it is nevertheless from a place of broad agreement that I shall seek to engage his 
argument in the book’s first four chapters.  
 How anxious ought we to be made by a sober recognition of our own fallibility, 
and what are the implications of this fallibility for the use of coercion? By offering 
somewhat different answers to these questions than the ones Malone-France provides, 
I hope both to highlight what I take to be original in his argument and to reveal certain 
weaknesses in its presentation.  
 
In Praise of Anxiety 
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 The core of the book’s argument is that an appreciation of human finitude, 
particularly human fallibility, appropriately results in a stance of epistemic anxiety, which 
in turn supports an ethico-political norm of non-coercion. The sort of anxiety Malone-
France has in mind is not pathological:  
An underlying and permanent sense of epistemic anxiety among a 
democratic citizenry is a socially and politically healthy thing precisely 
because it serves to maintain citizens’ acknowledgment of their own 
fallibility -- both as individuals and as members of religious and other 
groups -- and, thereby, discourages the sort of illegitimate absolutist and 
exclusivist attitudes that tend to undermine the reasonability and 
productivity of democratic discourses (29). 
Anxiety, on his account, is also an authentic and appropriate religious response -- an 
anti-idolatrous recognition of our creatureliness. Malone-France sees this emphasis on 
the limits of human thinking as a useful corrective to the Kantian attempt to ground 
autonomy on the majesty of human reason. As Malone-France points out, the 
categorical imperative to treat others never simply as means but always as ends is 
consistent with coercion “if one believes that the individual’s salvation -- be it political or 
spiritual -- depends on the acceptance of a set of beliefs and practices for the validity of 
which one claims absolute assurance” (14). But the virtue of anxiety blocks the attempt 
to circumvent the intent of Kant’s claim for autonomy by insisting that absolute 
assurance is impossible. Because one might, in the event, be wrong about what 
someone else’s salvation requires, one should refuse “to impose restrictions on the right 
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of individuals to define the terms of their own lives, so long as their decisions cause no 
substantive harm to others” (37). 
 Consider the following example that Malone-France provides, which I shall quote 
in full: 
Given the fallibility of any and all of our particularistic knowledge claims, 
we should have no greater moral fear than that we might impose on others 
a coercive norm that is, in fact, mistaken. The current debate in the United 
States over gay marriage provides a powerful and illuminating example of 
why this is so. Let us imagine, for the moment, that I am a traditionalist 
Christian who believes that the Bible reveals God’s definitive judgment 
prohibiting homosexuality and establishes as a matter of transcendental 
anthropology that homosexuality is a freely chosen, rather than a 
biologically dictated, manner of life. And let us further imagine that I have 
worked diligently within the public sphere to help ensure that existing legal 
prohibitions against gay marriage remain in force, thereby maintaining 
what I view as a consonance between divine and human law. What if I am 
wrong? What if God did not intend for those statements in the Bible that 
repudiate homosexuality to become the basis for such a universal 
proscription? What if there is no God? What if homosexuality is not (or not 
purely) a choice but a matter of strong (maybe even definitive) biological 
inclination? Then I would have played a role in the irreparable mangling of 
other human lives. I would have prevented other, rightfully autonomous 
5 
 
human beings from experiencing important elements of self-determination, 
fulfillment, and happiness. What could possibly give me the right to take 
that existential gamble on their behalf (88-9)? 
The point Malone-France is making with this example is of course not limited to the 
issue of same-sex marriage: as he puts it in another place, “[g]iven the acknowledgment 
that it is, in principle, always possible that I am the one who is mistaken, even regarding 
my most deeply held beliefs, I cannot legitimately claim the right to coerce others to 
believe as I do” (or presumably to behave as I believe they should) (36).  
 Neither, as I read him, is the point limited to “religious” commitments: because 
fallibility encompasses the entirety of our beliefs, anxiety ought to leave nothing 
untouched. Although Malone-France seems often to have in mind situations where the 
convictions that inform one’s political behavior belong to particularistic “worldviews” 
(see, e.g., 41), there is no obvious reason why the anxiety occasioned by human 
fallibility should be limited to these: one might, after all, be mistaken as well about 
scientific, mathematical, or historical facts; about what conclusions follow from one’s 
premises; and so on. But just because fallibility applies globally, including in less 
controversial cases, I want to ask whether in fact it is really this that lies at the root of 
the discomfort generated in me by the example above and other examples of coercion 
Malone-France provides. 
 
Fallibilism versus Doubt 
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 It is important to appreciate that none of what Malone-France says about anxiety 
is meant to imply a general skepticism about claims to moral, religious, or political 
knowledge, nor is it meant to suggest that all positions on a given issue are equally 
reasonable (16, 36). Nevertheless, Malone-France suggests, “there will always be a 
range of reasonable alternatives in relation to any issue of metaphysical, moral, or 
political significance” (36). When confronted with reasonable alternatives to our own 
convictions, we have every right to argue, and to attempt to persuade, “[b]ut we cannot 
arrogate to ourselves the right to coerce (at least not outside of the legitimately 
negotiated coercive requirements of democratic decision-making procedures)” (37). 
 I will return to Malone-France’s exception for democratically mediated coercion in 
a moment. First, however, I want to consider the question of whether fallibility as such -- 
considered as a feature of the human condition, distinguishable from specific reasons 
for doubting specific claims -- is sufficient to warrant the conclusion at which Malone-
France arrives. Is, in other words, the mere possibility that I could be wrong, absent 
positive reasons for thinking that I actually am, a good reason, as he suggests, for me to 
refrain from coercing others no matter the issue at stake? My worry is that at crucial 
points in the development of Malone-France’s argument, a stronger sort of doubt seems 
to creep in by means of examples that engage readers’ existing (rationally defensible) 
convictions. For instance, Malone-France’s example about same-sex marriage surely 
derives some of its force from the fact that many of his readers are likely to take 
ourselves to have good reasons to doubt the correctness of this imagined activist’s 
beliefs. But notice: good reasons. Our worry is not about the possibility of his being 
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wrong -- his fallibility -- but about its actuality. (Less tendentiously: it is the substance of 
the view that worries me.) 
 Although Malone-France’s argument is officially framed in terms of fallibilism as 
such -- i.e., “the acknowledgment that it is, in principle, always possible that I am the 
one who is mistaken” (36) -- it is helped along, I would suggest, by examples that 
implicitly elicit not merely Socratic anxiety, but stronger, more positive doubts on the 
part of sympathetic readers. A moment ago I quoted Malone-France’s remark that “there 
will always be a range of reasonable alternatives in relation to any issue of 
metaphysical, moral, or political significance” (36). I am not sure whether I would 
personally go as far as to say that there will always be reasonable alternatives, although 
certainly there is a range of reasonable alternatives about many issues, such as the 
ones that remain unsettled in the larger culture. But even as it stands, Malone-France’s 
formulation suggests, rightly in my view, that there might be alternatives that fall outside 
the range of what is reasonable. Some of the examples Malone-France supplies to 
illustrate the importance of a generalized epistemic anxiety -- including Nazism, slavery, 
and the authoritarian excesses of Calvin’s Geneva -- arguably belong (at least for his 
readers) in this latter category. That they are not live options (and indeed are 
paradigmatically abhorrent ones) facilitates the argument’s seemingly direct move from 
fallibility to non-coercion: none of us wants to be coerced into adopting those options. 
The tougher sell would be convincing readers that they ought not to “impose” views they 
themselves think are actually true, but which are nevertheless not universally shared, 
such as that the climate is changing largely as a result of human activity, or that people 
8 
 
are more likely to get shot when guns are widely available. If fallibility is held to rule out 
coercion, it rules it out not merely when it arises from false premises, but also when the 
premises are true. 
 
Autonomy and the Virtue of Tolerance 
 That fallibility is not, all by itself, a sufficient reason to refrain from coercion is, 
however, suggested by Malone-France’s exemption, noted a moment ago (see too 64), 
of coercion that is vetted by discursive, democratic decision-making procedures. If 
fallibility were really a reason to abstain from coercion, as seems to be suggested in 
Chapters 1 and 2, it is unclear why the democratic process should offer a route around 
this norm, since as Malone-France rightly notes in Chapter 4, “the procedural 
coordination of the deliberations of multiple fallible subjects does not somehow 
magically produce an infallible result” (81). On Malone-France’s account, unlike for 
Habermas, say, redeemability in discourse merely points to and does not constitute the 
truth of a validity claim.2 Because democratic, discursive procedures do not remove 
such claims from the realm of human fallibility, the fact that, on Malone-France’s telling, 
(some of) these claims apparently can legitimately be enforced suggests that fallibility is 
better conceived not as a bar to coercion tout court (though it clearly counsels a certain 
                                                
2 Whereas, in his early work, Habermas had argued that the validity of both claims to truth and claims to 
rightness depends upon their redeemability in discourse, his view has shifted. On his more recent 
account, both kinds of claims require discursive redemption, but the relation between validity and 
redeemability is different in theoretical cases than it is in moral ones. He writes, “Whereas rational 
acceptability merely points to the truth of assertoric propositions, it makes a constructive contribution to 
the validity of moral norms.” Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. 
Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998), 38. For a 
discussion and criticism of Habermas’s distinction, see my Morality and Social Criticism: The Force of 
Reasons in Discursive Practice (New York: Palgrave, 2005), Chapter 2. 
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wariness about it), but as a prompt to deliberation and procedural justice. While we 
cannot rise above fallibility, we can, through discourse, minimize our chances of being 
mistaken. 
 Deliberation is critically important, but when all is said, something must be done: 
a decision must be made, which will invariable result in winners as well as losers. As 
Rawls rightly observed, “[p]olitical power is always coercive power.”3 Whether in 
extreme cases, like war-time drafts, or quotidian ones, like speed limits, compliance with 
law is achieved partly (albeit not exclusively) through force or its threat. The question for 
Rawls is consequently not whether coercion is licit, but under what conditions. It is illicit, 
on his account, when it is employed without proper respect for one’s fellow citizens as 
free and equal, capable of framing, revising, and acting in accordance with their own 
conceptions of the good. In particular, this, for Rawls, means that when it comes to 
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, the reasons that motivate political 
action should be public. Though largely in agreement on the desirability of public 
reasons, Malone-France’s argument can be understood as shifting the philosophical 
grounds from which this demand arises -- from a Rawlsian/Kantian focus on the 
question of the respect one owes to other citizens/persons to a deeper appreciation of 
the implications of one’s own fallibility. This corresponds with a shift from tolerance, a 
moral-political virtue, to anxiety, an epistemic one (29). Whereas tolerance implies a 
judgment that the other is in error, anxiety directs critical scrutiny to one’s own cherished 
commitments. 
                                                
3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005 [1993]), 68, 
italics added. 
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 But I wonder if the epistemic approach, notwithstanding its many merits, is fully 
satisfying in this regard. It seems to reduce autonomy to a merely negative value: it is 
good that others should have the ability to make their own decisions, because I should 
minimize my chances of damaging other people’s lives by not presuming to impose my 
own fallible judgments on anyone other than myself. Their freedom is, so to speak, a by-
product of my incompetence and anxiety. The implication seems to be that if, per 
impossibile, I could be assured of forming correct opinions about moral, religious, and 
political matters, then I would have no reason not to coerce others into abiding by them. 
Malone-France says as much at one point: “only if I could infallibly know that I were right 
could I (perhaps) legitimately override the autonomy of another human being for my own 
purposes” (64). But the hesitant, parenthetical “perhaps” seems to suggest a nagging 
dissatisfaction with this view. The more “liberal” idea, after all, is that people should be 
free, within limits, to form false opinions and to make bad decisions. (Hence, I would 
argue, the continued need for tolerance: it is not because I hold open the possibility of 
their being right that I am willing to put up with people who believe that Barack Obama is 
a Kenyan-born Muslim socialist.) 
 
Secrecy and Coercion 
 Still, whatever its limits, it seems to me that Malone-France is correct to identify 
fallibility as a crucial ingredient in both religious and liberal thinking, without which 
existing political theoretical accounts remain impoverished. And just as Rawls’s 
emphasis on respect prompted fruitful debate about what exactly respect requires, so, I 
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would hope, Malone-France’s book will lead to further discussion of what anxiety 
requires. Although Malone-France often argues directly from fallibility to non-coercion, 
my sense is that what he really seeks to oppose is not coercion per se, but coercion 
grounded in secrecy and claims to infallibility. It is the latter, not necessarily the former, 
that is incompatible with fallibilistic anxiety. 
 In Chapter 3 Malone-France offers a powerful reading of Fear and Trembling, 
which follows Kierkegaard (or Silentio, his pseudonym) in seeing the story of Abraham’s 
“binding” of Isaac as dramatizing the tension between, on the one hand, modern ethics’ 
emphasis on the transparency and publicity of reasoning, particularly when that 
reasoning leads to action that affects others, and, on the other hand, a traditional 
emphasis, within Christianity and other religions, on private revelations and secrecy. As 
he explains the latter point, “No one who does not share directly in the revelation can be 
made to understand its force; it is inexplicable in abstraction from the concrete 
subjectivity of its experiential reception as an absolute determiner of belief and 
commitment” (60). Abraham is bound by a special, unique covenant with God, the 
demands of which are depicted by Silentio as directly in conflict with the universal 
demands of a publicly accessible morality. 
 Though the reasons behind his action are opaque to everyone other than himself 
-- or rather, precisely because of this -- Abraham is said to illustrate the heroic virtues of 
the “knight of faith,” who obeys God even when called to act in ways that no one else 
can understand or approve of. By answering only to God, Abraham, on Silentio’s telling, 
exercises “radical responsibility” for Isaac. But Malone-France departs from Silentio 
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insofar as he thinks we should see nothing admirable in Abraham’s actions. In 
appealing finally to a private revelation that cannot be communicated to or validated by 
others, the so-called “knight of faith” places undue confidence in his or her own capacity 
to have correctly understood the demands of faith.   
 Malone-France links Abraham’s silence -- his refusal or inability to explain 
himself -- to what he sees as the “delusional certitude” characteristic of the 9/11 
hijackers, as well as to the “ongoing controversy in the United States over the expansion 
of the realm of state secrecy under the banner of the ‘war on terror’” (65, 72). Since the 
book was published, his reflections have taken on added urgency in light of, inter alia, 
our current president’s secret “kill list”; the leaked Department of Justice memo justifying 
extra-judicial killings of American citizens; and the surveillance programs disclosed by 
Edward Snowden. Such examples collectively illustrate how, as Malone-France puts it, 
“the ‘heroic’ conception of Silentian radical responsibility, once accepted at a religious 
level, inevitably invades the realm of political life, with tragic and oppressive results” 
(73). Operating on the basis of privileged certitudes that cannot be redeemed publicly, 
whether in the form of private religious revelations or classified intelligence, these 
various figures -- would-be sovereigns, in a Schmittian sense, teleologically suspending 
the ethical or legal order -- may suppress but do not succeed in removing the anxiety 
that ought to attend our finitude. 
 An appreciation of my own fallibility -- the fact that I am not God -- should give me 
pause, Malone-France thinks, when I am tempted to act, on the basis of what I take to 
be a revealed truth, in ways that affect others. He writes, “I believe this analysis of the 
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essentially noncommunicative nature of such claims provides the missing framework 
needed to validate the Rawlsian argument that, as a general rule, religious reasons 
cannot be accepted by autonomous individuals as the basis for coercive regulations” 
(61). 
 
Democracy as Politics without Certainty 
 To make certainty the only valid basis for coercion is, I have suggested, to set the 
bar too high -- beyond what even the democratic process could deliver. If, as Rawls 
notes, coercion is an ineliminable feature of politics, we would seem to require 
standards for its just deployment within the realm of fallibility. Coercion under 
democratic conditions is licit not when it has cleared the hurdle of human finitude, but 
when it is undertaken in accordance with fair and public procedures, with due respect 
for the autonomy of other selves. On this point I believe Malone-France and I are really 
in complete agreement. Indeed, to forbid political coercion because of fallibility seems, 
ironically, to involve precisely the sort of craving for final certainty that Malone-France 
convincingly argues we should try to overcome. Perhaps politics is inherently, not 
merely contingently, tragic, as a result precisely of human finitude, but just as, on 
Malone-France’s account, we should not attempt to “solve” the problem of anxiety by 
appeal to some putative certainty, so, it might be argued, we should acknowledge that, 
within the realm of politics, coercion cannot be dissolved into persuasion, or decision 
into discourse, without remainder. “Inquiry, like life, must proceed in the absence of final 
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certainty,” Malone-France writes, and so too, we might add, must democratic politics 
(39).  
 
